Elicitation methods in decision making under risk allow a researcher to infer the subjective utilities of outcomes as well as the subjective weights of probabilities from the observed preferences of an individual. An optimally efficient elicitation method is proposed, which takes into account the inevitable distortion of preferences by random errors and minimizes the effect of such errors on the inferred utility and probability weighting functions. Under mild assumptions, the optimally efficient method for eliciting utilities (weights) of many outcomes (probabilities) is the following three-stage procedure. First, a probability is elicited whose subjective weight is one half. Second, an individual's utility function is elicited through the midpoint chaining certainty equivalent method employing the probability elicited at the first stage as an input. Finally, an individual's probability weighting function is elicited through the probability equivalent method.
Introduction
A choice-based elicitation procedure allows to infer the economic characteristics of an individual from the observed choice decisions of this individual. In choice under risk (e.g. Knight 1921) an important characteristic of an individual is his or her utility of outcomes (e.g. von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) . One of the first attempts to elicit an individual's utility function R R : ! u can be found in Ramsey (1931) . Classical non-parametric elicitation methods such as certainty equivalent and probability equivalent methods (e.g. Farquhar 1984) allow a researcher to infer the utility function of an individual without assuming a specific parametric form and without excluding the heterogeneity in the individual's preferences.
Unfortunately, the classical elicitation methods are not robust when individuals distort or misperceive probabilities (e.g. Karmarkar 1978 , McCord and de Neufville 1986 , von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986 , Tversky and Fox 1995 .
Prominent descriptive decision theories such as rank-dependent expected utility theory, or RDEU, (e.g. Quiggin 1982 ) and cumulative prospect theory, or CPT, (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1992 ) model the probability distortions in decision making under risk through a probability weighting function " # " # 1 , 0 1 , 0 : ! w . The method for eliciting subjective utility function is called robust if the inferred utility function of an individual is independent from the probability weighting function of an individual. The tradeoff method, the first robust elicitation method, was proposed by Wakker and Deneffe (1996) . Based on the tradeoff method, Abdellaoui (2000) generated a robust non-parametric elicitation of both utility and probability weighting functions. Other robust though not completely non-parametric elicitation methods were proposed by Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) . However, the existing literature on the elicitation methods does not address the role of random error in decision making under risk.
This paper constructs a robust non-parametric procedure for eliciting an individual's utility and probability weighting functions which is also optimally efficient i.e. it minimizes the propagation of random errors 1 . Camerer (1989) , Starmer and Sugden (1989) and Wu (1994) provide an extensive experimental evidence that there is some degree of randomness in the observed individual preference between lotteries. Smith and Walker (1993) and Harless and Camerer (1994, p.1265) found that real incentives reduce the randomness in individual responses. However, a researcher eliciting an individual's utility and probability weighting functions typically cannot afford the use of real incentives (e.g. Fennema and van Assen, 1998 , Abdellaoui, 2000 , Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000 , Abdellaoui et al. 2003 , Etchart-Vincent 2004 . Thus, the design of the elicitation methods should address fundamental problems caused by random error. An efficient elicitation procedure minimizes the impact of random errors on the inferred utility and probability weighting functions of an individual. To make a formal argument the structure of the stochastic element must be specified.
There is no consensus in the literature on the structure of stochastic utility. Harless and Camerer (1994 , pp. 1260 -1261 propose a constant choice-independent error rate with which the true asymmetric preference relation of an individual can reverse. Such a model does not work particularly well in the context of elicitation methods since these mathods rely on the symmetric (indifference) preference relation of an individual. Luce and Suppes (1965, p.335) and Camerer and Ho (1994, p.187) propose a logit form of stochastic utility. Sugden (1995, 1998) argue that random errors directly affect a preference relation of an individual rather than an 1 Abdellaoui et al. (2004) referred to an elicitation method as efficient in a different sense-when an elicitation method is composed of fewer measurement questions. Following Wakker and Deneffe (1996) I will call such a method as less laborious.
individual's utility of lotteries. Hey and Orme (1994, p.1301) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) propose an additive, normally distributed error term on the utility scale. Primarily for simplicity reasons and as a reasonably justifiable assumption, this paper also employs an additive, independently distributed error term on the RDEU-scale. With this structure of an error term, an elicitation procedure is claimed to be optimally efficient if it minimizes the expected sum of squared errors of the inferred utilities (weights) of a fixed number of elicited outcomes (probabilities).
The elicitation methods considered in this paper allow a researcher to infer the values of utility and probability weighing functions of an individual from the elicited subjective indifference relations between the lotteries. This paper considers two-outcome lotteries only. The
, denotes a lottery that yields an outcome x with probability p and an outcome x y & with probability p ' 1 . In the remainder of this paper it is assumed that the appropriate technique for extracting the indifference relation of an individual between two lotteries is available (see section 5.2 in Farquhar 1984 for a review). The indifference relations to be elicited are interrelated so that they impose sufficient restrictions on the utility and probability weighting functions of an individual. This enables a researcher to infer the values of the latter: an individual is indifferent between the lotteries 1 L and 2 L if and only if his or her utility from the lottery 1 L is equal to his or her utility from the lottery 2 L plus a random error term. According to the expected utility theory, utility from the lottery $ % y p x , , is given by
both RDEU and CPT (if x and y are gains) suggest that this utility equals to
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the existing elicitation methods. Section three introduces a three-stage procedure which is proposed to optimize the efficiency of a robust non-parametric elicitation. Section four concludes.
Existing elicitation methods
This section reviews the literature on several elicitation methods, frequently sited in the paper. Readers, familiar with the existing literature on the elicitation methods, can skip this section without the loss of continuity.
Certainty equivalence method
Certainty equivalent (CE) method allows to elicit a sure outcome 
. Subsequently, the researcher elicits the certainty equivalents of the lotteries
2 Unless otherwise indicated, throughout the paper index i goes from unity to some natural number
and so forth (e.g. Farquhar 1984) . The midpoint chaining refers to a special case of the chaining CE method, when only one probability 5 . 0 1 * p is used (e.g. Krzysztofowicz and Duckstein 1980) . The CE method remains valid only under the expected utility theory and it is not robust to the non-linear weighting of probabilities. Different biases and distortions associated with the CE method were discovered inter alia by Krzysztofowicz and Duckstein (1980) , Hershey et al. (1982), and Schoemaker (1985) . The CE method is a non-parametric elicitation method.
Probability equivalence method
The probability equivalent (PE) method allows to elicit a probability i p such that an individual is indifferent between the lottery $ %
and an outcome
According to the deterministic expected utility theory, an individual's utility of i z is just i p
are normalized by assumption (e.g. Farquhar 1984) . The PE method allows to elicit the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of an individual without chaining the earlier responses to the lotteries involved in subsequent comparisons. However, many individuals find the probability judgment to be cognitively demanding (e.g. Karmarkar 1978 ).
The PE method remains valid only under the expected utility theory and it is not robust to the non-linear probability weighting. Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) provide an extensive experimental evidence of systematic discrepancies between utility functions elicited through the CE and PE methods. The PE method is a non-parametric elicitation method.
Tradeoff method
The tradeoff (TO) method proposed by Wakker and Deneffe (1996) The probability p is also arbitrary chosen by a researcher. Wakker and Deneffe (1996) recommend to choose 3 1 * p because a typical individual is most probable to have a minimum subjective distortion of probability in the neighborhood of 3 1 * p (e.g. Fox 1995, Prelec 1998) . Apparently, this consideration motivated Daneffe (1996), Fennema and van Assen (1998) , Abdellaoui et al. (2002 Abdellaoui et al. ( , 2004 and Etchart-Vincent (2004) 
Elicitation of probability weighting function
CE, PE and TO methods described above allow to elicit the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of an individual. However, to describe an individual's decision making under risk completely his or her probability weighting function must be elicited as well. This section summarizes two approaches for eliciting a probability weighting function that are based on the TO method. Thus, as a starting point, the TO method is used to elicit a standard outcome sequence n x x ,..., 1 . Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) propose the following approach to elicit a subjective probability weighting function. For any probability 5 . 0 -p a researcher elicits an outcome x.
such that an individual is indifferent between the lottery $ %
and the lottery $ %
where outcomes
are the elements of the standard outcome sequence such that
. According to the deterministic RDEU and CPT, $ % $ % $ %
equation (8) 
(e.g. equation (9) in Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000) .
To infer the weight of a probability p a researcher must know the utility of an outcome x. . Since in general the outcome x. does not belong to the standard outcome sequence, Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) 
where an outcome l x is the element of the standard outcome sequence such that 1
Thus, the approach of Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) is based on the parametric fitting of a piecewise linear utility function. . Notice that according to the deterministic expected utility theory a probability i p is uniquely determined as n i p i * and, thus, its elicitation is nothing but a consistency check.
The approach of Abdellaoui (2000) changes the response scale i.e. an individual first
gives his or her answers in terms of monetary outcomes (in the TO questions) and then-in terms of probabilities (in the PE questions). Tversky et al. (1988) and Delquie (1993) provide an evidence that a preference elicitation may be distorted when the response scale is varied. The approach of Abdellaoui (2000) is non-parametric.
2.5.
Other elicitation methods Gonzalez and Wu (1999) propose a robust method for the simultaneous elicitation of utility and probability weighting functions through the alternating least squares approach. To infer the subjective utilities of outcomes 
. According to the RDEU, Ghirardato et al. 2003) . Furthermore, a preference average of outcomes x and z has an utility of
. Proceeding along these lines, a researcher is able to infer an individual's utility function over the entire interval " # x y, through the chaining elicitation of preference averages. However, Abdellaoui et al. (2004) argue that the experimental elicitation of preference averages is a cognitively demanding task for the subjects because the method of Ghirardato et al. (2003) involves compound lotteries. The method of Ghirardato et al. (2003) is non-parametric.
Three-stage procedure
To infer an individual's utility of n outcomes and an individual's weight of n probabilities, a researcher employs a three-stage (3S) procedure, which is non-parametric and robust to the non-linear weighting of probabilities. First, a researcher chooses a relatively small
of non-degenerate probabilities whose weights are elicited through the approach of Abdellaoui (2000) Third, a researcher elicits an individual's probability weighting function through the PE method described in section 2.2. The outcomes elicited at the second stage are used as an input for the PE method. Since TO, CE and PE methods are non-parametric elicitation methods, the proposed 3S procedure, which is a combination of TO, CE and PE methods, is also a nonparametric elicitation procedure. The 3S procedure can be further extended in the following way.
Consider the situation when
After the third stage a researcher proceeds again with the second stage, using a richer set of probabilities whose subjective weight has been just elicited at the third stage. Thus, the second and the third stages are repeated in a cycle until a desired number n of outcomes/probabilities is elicited. This extension, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
The choice parameter for a researcher is a number k of non-degenerate probabilities whose subjective weights are elicited at the first stage. For a fixed number n of outcomes (probabilities) whose subjective utility (weight) is to be elicited: the number of iterations m is uniquely determined from the choice of k e.g.
In the following sub-sections 3.1-3.3 the propagation of random errors is analyzed for every stage of the proposed 3S procedure. Sub-section 3.4 demonstrates how a researcher chooses the optimal number k to minimize the propagation of error across all stages of the elicitation procedure.
Propagation of error at stage one
At the first stage a researcher elicits N k , non-degenerate probabilities whose subjective weight is inferred through the approach of Abdellaoui (2000) . Hey and Orme 1994, Gonzalez and Wu 1999) , the indifference relations elicited through the TO method can be rewritten under RDEU as well as under CPT as the system of equations (1).
, the recursive system (1) can be rewritten as (2).
$ % $ % 
It follows from the system of equations (2) and the utility of the first and the last member of the standard outcome sequence have the lowest variance. In other words, under the TO method random errors distort the inferred utility of the medium members of the standard outcome sequence more severely. The propagation of an error is less severe for the first and the last members of the standard outcome sequence. In contrast, Deneffe (1996, p. 1148) intuitively suggested that the error propagation is increasing for the later members of the standard outcome sequence.
Subsequently, a researcher elicits a standard sequence of probabilities 
In general, a random error occurring when the PE method is used can have a different variance than the random error occurring under the TO method because two methods employ different types of elicitation questions. Thus, into a decimal number system is
. With the above notation, every outcome elicited by the end of the second stage, except for the highest outcome $ % It follows from proposition 1 that at the first and the second stages a researcher elicits a sequence of outcomes that are expected to be equally spaced in terms of subjective utility.
Specifically, after an iteration : of the chaining CE method the elicited sequence of outcomes divides an interval 
Propagation of error at stage three
At the end of the first stage a standard sequence of probabilities with the later equality due to proposition 1. The system of equations (7) probabilities that are expected to be equally spaced in terms of subjective weight.
Optimally efficient elicitation procedure
Let us assess the efficiency of the 3S procedure with respect to the elicitation of an individual's utility function. The first step is to calculate the expected sum of squared errors affecting the inferred utilities of n elicited outcomes. The optimally efficient 3S procedure aims to minimize the expected sum of squared errors (8)-(9). To design the optimally efficient elicitation procedure a researcher chooses the number
that minimizes the right hand side (RHS) of the equations (8)- (9). The first part of the RHS of equation (8) increases in k. However, the second and the third part of the RHS of equation (8), which are presented together in the second line of the equation, both decrease in k.
Thus, when 0 2 1 * 1 the first part of the RHS of equation (8) , the second and the third part of the RHS of equation (8) cancel out.
The remaining first part of the RHS of equation (8) increases in k. Thus, the optimal 3S procedure is to set k to its minimum 1 * k . In other words, when the PE and CE elicitation questions are cognitively undemanding i.e. they induce no random errors in the elicited responses of an individual; the optimal elicitation procedure is the method of Abdellaoui et al. (2004) as described in section 2.5. More general result is obtained in proposition 3.
Proposition 3
Assuming an additive and independently distributed error term on the RDEU-scale, such that an error is most distorting in the TO questions and least distorting-in the CE questions i.e. There is an established empirical support for the assumption that Ronen (1973) and Karmarkar (1978) report that the untrained individuals find the PE elicitation questions more difficult that the CE questions. A plausible explanation is that the PE method requires an individual to make a probability judgment-a task that occurs seldom in real life experiences. Therefore, the untrained individuals are not accustomed to make a probability judgment and they find it more difficult. This observation can be interpreted that random errors have a more distorting effect in the PE elicitation questions compared to the CE questions. To summarize, the empirical evidence suggests that an untrained individual is characterized by an inequality i.e. the distorting effect of random errors is the same in TO, PE and CE elicitation questions, a (conservative) value of the threshold
. As discussed in section 2.3 the most popular probability chosen for the TO method is 3 1 * p , which typically has a subjective weight $ % 3 1 * p w . Thus, the practical implication of the main theoretical result of this paper is that the optimally efficient method for eliciting utilities of eleven or more outcomes is the 3S procedure with 1 * k (under mild assumptions of proposition 3). No definite statement can be made on the efficiency of elicitation methods for eliciting utilities of less than eleven outcomes, unless some stronger assumptions are imposed.
The existing experimental studies that elicit the utility function of an individual by means of the simple TO method construct a standard outcome sequence with 6 -n outcomes. Wakker and Deneffe (1996) and Fennema and van Assen (1998) 
. Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) , Abdellaoui (2000) and Abdellaoui et al. (2002 Abdellaoui et al. ( , 2003 use 6 * n . Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986, p. 254) intuitively recommend to use 6 3 --n . The only experimental study that employs the 3S procedure with 1 * k , Abdellaoui et al. (2004) , elicits a subjective utility of 11 * n losses and 8 * n gains. Thus, a current experimental practice and the intuitive recommendations in the literature are consistent with the optimally efficient elicitation procedure formally derived in proposition 3 that minimizes the expected sum of squared errors.
So far the optimally efficient elicitation procedure was considered only for the utility function. As a next step, consider the optimally efficient elicitation procedure for the probability weighting function. It follows from the equations (3) and (7) that the expected sum of squared errors of the inferred weights of n probabilities elicited through the 3S procedure is just the expected sum of squared errors (8)- (9) of the inferred utilities of n outcomes elicited through the 3S procedure plus a constant 2 2 1 n . Since the objective function (8) to be minimized is the same in both cases (except for a constant), the optimally efficient elicitation procedure for the probability weighting function is the same as that for the utility function.
Conclusion
Propagation of random errors constitutes a fundamental challenge for the elicitation methods in decision making under risk. Although this problem was recognized since long, the existing literature is limited to the informal arguments (e.g. Wakker and Deneffe 1996) and intuitive recommendations (e.g. von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986) how to minimize the propagation or random errors. Partially this is due to the lack of consensus on the structure of stochastic utility since little is known how random errors enter into an individual's decision making under risk. As a starting point for a formal argument, this paper assumes a specific error term-an additive, independently distributed error on the RDEU-scale-and derives an optimally efficient elicitation procedure that minimizes the expected sum of squared errors. An interesting extension of this paper is to compare its result with optimally efficient procedures derived from other structures of random error.
Under mild assumptions, the derived optimally efficient method for eliciting subjective utilities (weights) of many outcomes (probabilities) is the following three-stage procedure. First, a probability, whose subjective weight is one half, is elicited through the approach of Abdellaoui (2000) . Second, an individual's utility function is elicited through the midpoint chaining CE method using the probability elicited at the first stage as an input. Third, an individual's probability weighting function is elicited through the PE method using the outcomes elicited at the second stage as an input. This elicitation procedure is non-parametric (no assumption about the functional form of utility and probability weighting functions is made) and robust (the inferred subjective utility function is independent from the inferred subjective probability weighting function). The first two steps of this procedure are used by Abdellaoui et al. (2004) for the experimental elicitation of utility function. Thus, this paper can be regarded as a theoretical complement of Abdellaoui et al. (2004) providing insights on the optimal efficiency of their elicitation method. the system of equations (6) the system of equations (6) becomes (A5).
The assumption that lemma A1 holds for any iteration 
The weight $ % 
In equation (A7) we already exploited the fact that 
